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Abstract 
 
The paper considers the potential for community based forest management (of existing 
forests) in developing countries, as a future CDM strategy, to sequester carbon and 
claim credits in future commitment periods.  This kind of forestry is cost effective, and 
should bring many more benefits to local populations than do afforestation and 
reforestation, contributing more strongly to sustainable development. However 
community forest management projects are small scale, and the transaction costs 
associated with justifying them as climate projects are likely to be high.  A research 
project being carried out in six developing countries is testing carbon measurement and 
monitoring methods which can be carried out by community members with very little 
formal education, which should greatly reduce these transaction costs.  Using hand-held 
computers with GIS capability and attached GPS, villagers with four years of primary 
education are able to accurately map their forest resource and input data from sample 
plots into a programme which calculates carbon values.   
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1. Introduction  
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, forestry will be permitted as a sink measure under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), but only in the forms of ‘afforestation’ and 
‘reforestation’.  These tend to involve large-scale plantation systems, which although 
cost effective in terms of carbon sequestered, in most cases have very limited benefits to 
local populations, if any.  However, many communities in developing countries have 
started to manage existing natural forest in a sustainable way, under a variety of 
programmes such as Joint Forest Management (JFM) and Community Forest 
Management.  These schemes were set up for conservation and social development 
purposes, not with a climate related motive.  Although this does not qualify for CDM 
under present LULUCF rules, generally all these types of Community Based Forest 
Management (CBFM) do result in additional carbon sequestration.  If the decision 
regarding eligibility of forest management under CDM were to be reversed in the future, 
the financial incentives provided by sale of carbon offsets could potentially swing the 
balance and encourage many more communities to engage in this sort of forest 
management, and thus promote the protection of tropical forests and the avoidance of 
deforestation, which in itself a major environmental problem worldwide.  In particular it 
would encourage communities in remote locations, who because of their unfavourable 
location are unable to market regular forest products, to participate in forest 
management and reduce the pressure of deforestation.  
 
The paper first considers the potential of CBFM as an instrument for carbon 
sequestration, for example during a second commitment period under a future CDM-
type set-up.  It considers some of the broader implications of this as regards equity and 
carbon entitlements.  It then turns to the specific question of the transaction costs related 
to CBFM as a carbon strategy, and how to reduce these.  CBFM projects are by nature 
small scale and represent a low intensity means of sequestering carbon. Compared to 
afforestation,  the amount of carbon saved per hectare per year is low, although the 
forest management costs are also much lower.  This means that transaction costs per ton 
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and per hectare are likely to be rather high, even if simplified procedures for small scale 
forestry CDMs are applicable1. 
 
An important element of the transaction costs will be the measuring and monitoring of 
increases in biomass in the forest, the methods to do which will have to adhere to the 
strict LULUCF rules as regards carbon measurement and accounting.  The costs of 
employing professional intermediaries to use scientific methods to gather, process and 
submit such data are likely to be high, meaning that any financial gains to the 
community are likely to be wiped out.  The paper considers the possibility of 
developing techniques which can largely be carried out by the communities themselves, 
at a much lower cost,  and whether the results could be as reliable as ‘expert’ 
measurement and monitoring. 
 
The paper describes a research project being carried out by the University of Twente 
and ITC (the International Institute for Earth Observation and Geo-Information), both in 
the Netherlands, and three regional research institutes (in Nepal, Tanzania and Senegal), 
which is testing carbon assessment methods involving the use of handheld GPS/GIS 
devices by local communities who are already engaged in community forest 
management activities for other reasons (conservation, timber production, non-timber 
forest products, ecotourism, firewood supply etc).  The purpose of the research is to 
demonstrate that such communities can make reliable assessments of the increased sink 
values of their forest and monitor this over an extended time period.  If this objective 
can be realised, it may help to open the way for reconsideration of the types of sinks 
allowed under CDM in the future, and for communities of this kind to supplement their 
forest based livelihoods through the sale of their carbon as a non-timber forest product 
in the future commitment periods, and possibly to the ‘non-compliance’ market in the 
shorter term.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 A decision was taken at CoP9 to introduce simplified procedures for small scale forestry projects (those 
sequestering  less than 8kT carbon per year) during the first commitment period, in parallel to those for 
small scale energy projects. 
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2. Sinks in the CDM 
 
As confirmed at CoP9 (Milan, December 2003), when the Kyoto Protocol comes into 
force, the  Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) will provide an instrument by which 
finance from the North may be used, among other things, to support certain kinds of 
tropical forestry (afforestation and reforestation).  The decision to include the sink 
function in CDM has been welcomed by many, since about 25% of atmospheric carbon 
is believed to derive from deforestation and other land use changes.  However, there are 
considerable doubts about the wisdom as regards the selected form of these sinks, both 
from an ecological and from a social point of view.  Afforestation and reforestation 
projects will have a tendency to be large, low labour input schemes owned by 
companies or formal organisations, and will often involve monocultures of fast growing 
species since this is a cheap and effective way of sequestering carbon.  Moreover there 
is a risk that if they prove to be competitive in carbon terms, considerable areas of non-
forest land may be converted to carbon-dedicated tree plantation and alienated from use 
by local populations for other purposes for 60 years and more.  Some writers believe 
that afforestation and reforestation are the most socially inequitable of all sink 
possibilities (Saunders etc al 2003).  All in all it is clear that this approach is unlikely to 
yield positive benefits for the mass of the rural population in the developing world, and 
thus may not live up to strong criteria of sustainable development. 
 
As Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), Brown et al (2003) and others point out, there are 
several ways in which forest can play a role in carbon sequestration, in addition to 
afforestation and reforestation.  The decision to allow only afforestation and 
reforestation projects under CDM (essentially, the plantation of trees in areas where 
there are none now) cuts out many other important aspects of forest management, in 
particular the management of existing tropical forests.  Improved forest management (eg 
by reduced impact forest logging) can both increase sequestration and reduce emissions.  
Conservation and protection against deforestation cuts emissions. Moreover, 
substitution of sustainably produced biomass for fossil fuels may also be a forest based 
climate strategy to cut emissions.  Avoided deforestation and secondary forest 
regeneration is thought to be a much more cost effective means of reducing atmospheric 
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carbon than afforestation and reforestation (Pearce, 2000; Watson et al. 2000; Klooster 
and Masera 2000; Malhi et al 2003).  Slowing deforestation and promotion of forest 
regeneration could reduce 12-15% of expected emissions in 2050, a not inconsiderable 
contribution to the overall problem (Klooster and Masera, 2000). 
 
A very important aspect of this is the co-benefits that can be obtained from forest 
management and particularly from community based forest management for carbon 
(Swingland, 2003; Katoomba 2002).  These range from ecological gains (conservation 
of wilderness values, biodiversity protection, watershed management, erosion control) 
to social gains (provision of livelihoods).   There is no doubt that both nature and 
society will in the long run be better served by management and protection of existing 
forests, than by industrial size plantation projects designed to sop up as much carbon as 
possible in the shortest possible time.   The UNFCCC is after all only one of several 
international agreements and forest management offers an opportunity for it to join up 
with efforts under the Convention for Biodiversity (CBD), the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) and the Millennium Goals. 
 
 
3. Why CBFM was not included in the CDM 
 
 
There are a number of reasons why forest management in general and CBFM projects in 
particular were not accepted under Clean Development Mechanism.  The first is related 
to the idea that sinks in general should only be allowed to account for a small proportion 
of the carbon reduction (if any), since the global warming problem is seen to be caused 
fundamentally by unsustainable use of fossil fuel and the need to change energy 
consumption patterns (Greenpeace, 2003).  This view is held by a number of 
environmental groups despite the fact that about a quarter of atmospheric carbon in fact 
derives from forest clearance and other land use changes.  Forest management was 
rejected by such groups on the grounds that if it were allowed, it will offer a cheaper 
alternative,  open the flood gates to land use related projects, reduce the pressure to 
invest in energy conservation and renewable energy, and particularly reduce the transfer 
 7
of improved technology from North to South (Mwandosya, 2000).   On the other hand 
sinks were strongly lobbied for by a number of Northern countries including the USA 
and Australia.    The Marrakech compromise, reached under considerable time pressure 
at the meeting, was to accept a limited form of sinks, i.e. only afforestation and 
reforestation.  But a better way to control the proportion of investment in sinks is to cap 
it – as has also been done2.  This cap could rise in the future as commitments are 
increased.  At present reduction quotas are relatively small – averaging 5% of the 1990 
emissions of the industrialised countries – but in later commitment periods these will 
have to increase up to 50 or 60% if atmospheric carbon is to be kept at what are 
considered ‘safe’ levels.  At that point, there will be more room for sinks, and 
particularly for forest management, without compromising the drive for energy 
efficiency and renewable alternatives.  
 
Another major reason for not including management of existing forests was the fear 
among many that this might lead to the destruction of such forest and its replacement 
with (faster growing, easier to manage, more carbon-profitable) plantation forest.  As 
the rule now stands, afforestation can only take place on land which has never been 
forested, and reforestation on land that has not had forest on it since 1990, so there is no 
possibility of destroying forest to plant more under CDM finance.  This does remain a 
problem if management of existing forest is allowed in the future – after all, enrichment 
planting and replanting are valid forest management practices which may conducted in 
the best and most sustainable situations, where forests are being managed for a variety 
of objectives. The problem is to ensure that such practices are not used to reduce the 
current multi-functional role of the forest to a single one – carbon saving -  or 
at least, that a balance among functions is attained.   There would certainly have to be 
some controls and enforceable codes of conduct regarding forest management practices 
under CDM.  Indeed there is active work going on at the moment to try to find 
acceptable forest management and sustainable development criteria to protect these 
broader values under CDM conditions, as in the ENCOFOR project for example 
(Katoomba, 2003; FACE 2004).   The difficulties of bringing such standards in to the 
process are going to be political, not technical.     
                                                 
2
 Annex 1 countries are allowed to use sinks up to  1% of their base year emissions, times 5 (ie about one 
fifth of their total emission reductions, per year, over the 5 years of the commitment period). 
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Much of the stalling up to now in the discussions on sinks in general, for for forest 
management in particular, was due to the permanence issue: carbon in woody biomass 
is held for only the lifetime of the plant, and thereafter re-released into the atmosphere; 
and a forestry project may be subject to risk of unplanned carbon release (fires, 
accidents etc).  This is as true for afforestion/reforestation projects as for forest 
management and cannot be used any more as an argument for excluding forest 
management, since the concept of temporary CERS (tCERS asnd ICERS) was accepted 
at CoP9 to deal with this problem. 
 
At the same time there are a number of other technical problems related to inclusion of 
sinks under CDM, and of forest management and avoided deforestation in particular.  
To demonstrate real carbon savings and additionality, the procedures for verifying the 
carbon offsets must be very rigorous, using technically approved measurement methods.  
While the carbon held, for example by 30,000 ha of newly planted eucalyptus forest can 
be fairly easily assessed at any point in time, the changes in carbon held before and after 
patches of existing (mixed species, mixed age) forest are brought under CBFM are 
much more difficult to measure and to verify.  It was at least in part these practical 
problems that barred the way to forest management in the last round of climate 
negotiations, and it is in this area that work needs to be done if forest management is to 
be accepted in the future.   Procedures have now been developed by the IPCC for the 
case of afforestation and deforestation (IPCC 2003) and these will need to be further 
developed if forest management and CBFM in particular, is to be admitted in the future. 
 
4. Integrating carbon management in CBFM 
 
4.1 The nature of CBFM 
Community forest management, as an intervention, i.e. on a project basis, long predates 
the carbon issue3.  It was started as a means of reversing degradation of natural forests 
                                                 
3
 It goes without saying that communities have managed forests since time began.  What is meant here are 
schemes in which there is some intervention from outside to stimulate this or re-enforce it.  There are 
many types of CBFM ranging from essentially autonomous management which is recognised and 
accepted as such by the forest administration, through collaborative efforts of local communities with 
state or private organisations, to relatively top down management systems in which the local people are 
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and trends of deforestation in developing countries, which occurs because many forests, 
though legally the property of the state, are de facto unregulated common property 
resources.  Because local communities generally do not have legal rights over these 
forests,  and the state does not have the means to manage them adequately, they have 
been subject to mismanagement, both by third parties (clandestine logging companies or 
corrupt state forest officers) and by members of the local communities themselves 
(illegal clearance for agriculture, over-exploitation of forest resources etc).  By 
clarifying the ownership and rights situation and putting the local community at the 
helm by means of a recognized, locally legitimate management committee or co-
operative, much of this plundering of the forests can be halted.   
 
The incentive for the local community is usually greater returns on forest products 
(Poffenberger 1990; Hobley, 1996, Agarwal and Ribot 1999).  Under CBFM, state 
owned natural forest is essentially contracted out to local communities, which then have 
exclusive rights to harvest certain products under an agreed management plan, which 
ensures that the rate of harvesting does not exceed the rate of natural regeneration.  In 
West Africa this is mainly being applied in the context of fuelwood supply around 
major cities (Kerkhof, 2000; Kerkhof, Madougou and Foley, 2001; Foley et al 1997; 
Dianka 1999) while in India various forms of Joint Forest Management now provide 
forest dependent people legal and sustained access to a variety of non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs) such as bamboo, gum, rubber, beedi leaves, wild fruits, medicinal 
herbs, as well as timber in some cases, for income generation (Poffenberger and 
McGean, 1996;  Sarin, 2001, Skutsch 1999).  In Mexico, large numbers of communities 
are managing the forest under CBFM for timber production and have set up local 
cooperative enterprises to further this, displacing illegal forestry concerns which had 
earlier had unhindered access to the forests (Klooster and Masera 2000). Unlike the 
illegal companies, who just move on when they have taken whatever timber is valuable, 
it is not in the interest of the local community to run the forest into the ground; they use 
a management plan which ensures sustainability of the resource.  In a few places, 
communities have been encouraged to take up forest management for conservation 
reasons and biodiversity protection, but the lack of economic incentive is a serious 
                                                                                                                                               
essentially just labourers. For the purposes of this paper I am not distinguishing between these types but 
use CBFM as a general term to cover them all. 
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problem.  In the E. Usambaras of Tanzania, in the surroundings of the Amani Nature 
Reserve, villagers are starting to draw up forest management plans for their own forest 
lands partly with a view to ecotourism, recognizing that money can be earned by 
guiding tourists around, and that biodiversity and a healthy forest is essential for this.  
Clearly, the further the forest is from national infrastructure (roads, facilities), the higher 
the transport costs, and the less the opportunity for earning cash from sustainable forest 
management.  And this is perhaps where carbon, as a ‘non-timber forest product’ 
(Skutsch, 2003) becomes most interesting; for carbon is a virtual product, with no real 
transport costs. 
 
4.2 Valorising carbon in CBFM 
During the AIJ phase, a number of forest based projects were included (19 out of the 
total of 125 AIJ projects), some of which involved forest management in developing 
countries.  Most of these were primarily directed to carbon saving, and set up expressly 
for this purpose (eg FACE projects), although of course they could not claim official 
credits for this. In some cases finance was raised on the basis of the market value of the 
carbon saved, and in a few, the local communities were actually paid on a per ton basis 
(eg the Scolel Te project in Mexico (Tipper 2002;  Brown and Corbera 2003).  In others 
this link was never made, for example, in the project in Burkina Faso, which was based 
on an earlier CBFM project designed to produce sustainable fuelwood supplies, the 
finance for the AIJ project went to cover the overhead costs of the implementing 
agencies and the local community was not in any way paid for the carbon sequestered.  
Thus from the AIJ experience one can unfortunately not learn a great deal about how 
the grafting on of carbon to existing forest management activities could stimulate these 
and create the necessary financial incentive to local communities. 
 
For if CBFM were to be accepted under a future CDM type mechanism, carbon would 
in all likelihood be only one of many products marketed by the community, and 
probably not the most important or even the most valuable.  Most non-timber forest 
products have relatively low commercial value individually. Carbon could be seen 
simply as an additional non-timber forest product, which increases the overall economic 
gain,  possibly tipping the balance so that in the eyes of the community the total 
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financial picture becomes positive and makes overall management worthwhile (this 
would be necessary if the CDM carbon additionality criterion is to be met).  
 
It is evident that for maintenance of ecological forest values (biodiversity conservation, 
watershed protection), communities are at present not rewarded at all in money terms, 
although the benefits mainly flow to others downstream (both in the physical sense and 
inter-generationally) (Pagiola et al, 2002).  Lack of payment or incentive for these 
services to the public can be seen as a major reason why many communities have 
allowed their forests to degrade, or have actively participated in deforestation by 
encroaching on the forest area and converting it to other, more immediately profitable 
uses.  Carbon is the first of these forest environmental services that, through the Kyoto 
Protocol, has been given financial value and a market system, and this opens up 
interesting possibilities for future arrangements for other forest services (Pagiola et al 
2002). At the same time, of course, the introduction of a market system may bring with 
it many negative effects, for example increasing gaps between those with access to the 
market and those without, so any experiments in this type of arrangement need to be 
very carefully monitored and critically investigated (Corbera, 2002).  
 
4.3 Equity issues under CBFM 
Indeed, equity issues under CBFM as a whole have not yet been thoroughly researched, 
and the level of success of this approach in terms of distribution of benefits undoubtedly 
needs further study.  At present this approach is thought by many forestry professionals 
to be a cost effective and ‘fairer’ model for forest management, than systems which rely 
only on overstretched and inefficient state forest management.   Many countries are 
moving towards greater empowerment of local communities over forests in this belief.  
But in welcoming this major shift towards ‘participatory forestry’, it is as naïve to 
conclude that it will solve all deforestation problems as it is to think that it will 
necessarily be just and democratic at the local level.  The reality is that any financially 
attractive activity at local level is potentially subject to appropriation by those with 
power and influence, and the fact that such an activity bears the label ‘community’ is 
not in itself any guarantee that the benefits are widely distributed.   Undoubtedly there 
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are many unresolved conflicts and inequities in many cases of community based forest 
management, not least in the area of gender (Locke, 1999; Sarin 2001).   
 
If CBFM is directed towards carbon harvesting in the future because this offers an 
attractive financial return, then equity issues certainly need to be addressed, both at the 
local community level, and in the question of who get what in the whole chain of the 
carbon market. Valorizing carbon means that the issue of carbon entitlements has to be 
settled.  As Saunders et al (2003) point out, if carbon is considered a mineral, the 
precedent would be for the state to claim full ownership, while if it were considered a 
crop, then under normal property law it would be owned by the cultivators.  There are 
likely to be legal struggles over this issue in the future, particularly in cases where the 
forest is still state property.  This is not to say that management by local communities 
would then be out of the question, since they might equally well be paid for their 
services in ‘nurturing’ the carbon, rather than for the product itself, but the various 
modalities, and the economic shares, need to be considered.   
 
This also means that rights to other aspects of forest property may be held up to the 
light, examined, and possibly clarified.  This could lead to long overdue, real 
empowerment of local communities over forest resources, but at the same time, 
formalisation of local ownership may bring with it problems, and not necessarily be in 
the interests of the rural poor.  What is ‘the local community’ and who speaks for it,  are 
questions of enormous importance.  In parts of West Africa, where there is a general 
movement towards decentralization, ownership of forest is being devolved to the local 
communes, but these are elected bodies which span several villages, while the groups 
that actually manage the forest under CBFM are at sub-village level.  The question of 
who gets what of the profits harvested from the forest has not been resolved.  With 
profitable carbon added to the equation the stakes are simply set to become higher, and 
the share going to the actual forest managers may get less rather than more.  Moreover 
certain groups among the managers themselves may become marginalized or pushed out 
all together.  The market is a powerful mechanism, but also a dangerous one as far as 
equity is concerned (Brown and Corbera, 2003).  Smith and Scherr (2002) in 
recognising this suggest that conditions need to be made under which more equity can 
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be achieved, but clearly the underlying rights to land, forest and to the products of land 
and forest have to be equitable, and the local organisation too, before any such 
arrangements could be made to work in an equitable way.    
 
 
5. Transaction costs of CMFB carbon projects 
 
The main reason for pursuing the valorisation of carbon in CBFM, apart from the fact 
that it might be an efficient and effective way to reduce atmospheric carbon, is that the 
market opportunity offered by carbon offset sales could, in principle, be used as a push 
towards better management of forests for a wide variety of other benefits, social and 
ecological.  New CBFM initiatives would then be additional, in CDM terms, because it 
is precisely the carbon reward that makes them worthwhile from the community’s point 
of view.  
 
For carbon to be profitable to the community as a non-timber forest product however, 
the transaction costs associated with its ‘harvesting’ it would have to be considerably 
lower than the market price of the carbon4.  These transaction costs relate to formulation 
of the activity as a climate project with a baseline, getting it approved as such, 
measuring and monitoring carbon sequestered, establishing the validity of these 
measurements through formal procedures of verification, marketing the carbon offsets, 
etc.  These costs may be high, for carbon is a heavily controlled product.  The 
bureaucratic steps involved  – all of which have, in the end,  to be paid for by the 
producer – will be many, complicated and expensive.   As Brown and Corbera (2003) 
point out, the greater the number of stakeholders and actors in the process, the greater 
the danger of the control, and the profits, falling into the hands of powerful groups.   For 
this reason it is important to consider to what extent the necessary activities can be 
carried out by the producers themselves. 
 
Several studies have already considered the potential of CBFM as a carbon 
sequestration instrument and done some costing on this.  For example, a team working 
                                                 
4
 The market price of carbon from forest will in any case be lower than from energy projects, reflecting its 
semi-permanence. 
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in Harda (Madhya Pradesh) established that teak and dry deciduous forest under 
community protection in Joint Forest Management (JFM) schemes sequestered 1 to 3 
metric tons of carbon per hectare per year as a result of annual growth (Poffenberger et 
al 2001).  Forest experts established this contemporaneously by comparing unprotected 
areas with those which were protected under a variety of different mechanisms 
including community based forest management   The forest management costs vary 
according to management activity but range from $1 per ha to $100, so at the lower end 
of the scale the management activities could in fact be financed entirely out of the 
carbon income, assuming a market price of $5 per ton.  But this does not  take into 
account the carbon transaction costs.   If the activities connected with these are carried 
out by experts, there is likely to be little margin of gain to the communities themselves.  
As Landell-Mills and Porras (1999) have pointed out, it is precisely the transaction costs 
that are likely to be the key factor in determining whether or not such forest 
management for carbon is financially feasible. 
 
A parallel study in Adilabad (Andhra Pradesh) found that protection of coppiced shoots 
and seedlings resulted in storage of 5-7 tons of carbon per ha per year for degraded teak 
sites and 6 for mixed forest (Poffenberger et al 2002).  The $60-$120 earned per ha 
would easily be sufficient to cover the overhead costs of forest management, although 
again the transaction costs were not calculated or included.  In both the cited cases, the 
carbon measurements were made by experts,  rather than local community people, and 
the costs of this were not recorded.   
 
Other well-known projects related to carbon sequestration and community based CBFM 
in developing countries include the Noel Kampff project in Bolivia, where management 
costs were estimated at $1.25 per ton (WRI, 2002).  In this project the transaction costs 
were partially estimated.  For a 634,000ha area of mixed forest containing 118m tons of 
carbon, estimation of mean stock to +/- 10%, at 95% level of confidence, would require 
81 sample plots and cost US$19,000; 5% accuracy would require 452 sample plots and 
cost US$108,000.  Fixed costs (independent of sample size) would cost an additional 
US$140,000 (Chomitz, 2002).   These costs are based on the assumption that 
professionals are involved in the sampling, with local assistants. 
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Unfortunately transaction costs for small projects which involve community groups are 
thought to be relatively higher than for industrial plantations which are more uniform in 
nature and under one owner, as well as having the advantage of economies of scale 
(Smith and Scherr, 2002).  Chomitz concludes that the cost per ton of measuring carbon 
stored in biomass will be approximately inversely proportional to the size of the carbon 
sink (this follows from standard statistical theory). The cost for small, heterogeneous 
forest management projects could be exorbitant if done by fieldwork, especially if high 
levels of accuracy (e.g. 5% rather than 10% as in the case described above) are 
demanded.  He suggests therefore that such projects might have to rely on standardized, 
benchmarked (default) values (Chomitz, 2002), but these are likely to be set at very 
conservative (unfavourable) levels.  Of course it is also reasonable to expect that aerial 
and satellite imagery may in the future be able to offer considerable, and relatively 
cheap, data – which with ground-truthing (for example by local communities) might 
turn out to be a good solution for monitoring changes in forest biomass.  But it is 
unlikely that remote sensing on its own will ever be sufficiently precise for setting up 
the initial baseline measurements, which is perhaps the most costly activity that has to 
be undertaken.  Moreover ground truthing at least for spot sampling will always have to 
complement the use of remote data.   
 
One possibility is that for this kind of project, which has many benefits beyond the 
carbon value, government should subsidise some of the transaction costs (Michaelowa 
et al, 2003).  The Dutch programme for CDMs at present reimburses small energy 
projects for the costs of preparing the baseline, after an initial screening process, and 
other purchasers of carbon offsets might be willing to do the same for forestry projects 
with social benefits.  The problem would be better solved however if the scale of the 
projects could be increased for example by bundling or by bringing many small CBFM 
instances under one umbrella project with one baseline and one certification process.  
Not only would this greatly reduce the overall transaction costs, it would simplify the 
process of marketing the offsets.  Larger purchasers are generally only interested in 
larger projects, for example, the PDF looks only at projects producing carbon work 
€3m, or 50kT tons of CO2  per year (Michaelowa et al, 2003), and in the future, as 
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emission reduction quotas rise, one could expect that most investors will want to 
purchase in larger quantities.   At present there is a specially ruling with simplified 
procedures for small LULUCF projects producing under 8 kT CO2  per year, and this is 
very welcome in the first instance.  In the long run, however, if carbon becomes a 
serious commodity on the world market, it is clear that such ‘special cases’ will be 
relegated to the margins.   
 
The general conclusion from the small number of available studies of carbon in forest 
managements projects is that reducing the transaction costs is a necessary if not 
sufficient step for including CBFM under CDM in the future. Different methodologies 
with lower costs need to be tested and presented to the policy makers for eventual 
approval.  One interesting possibility is to let the local population do their own 
measurement and monitoring.  There is at least one example of a project in which 
communities have been involved themselves in measuring carbon savings (Tipper, 
2002).  This mainly involved agro-forestry and small farm systems in Mexico (the 
Scolel Te Project).  Here a trust fund was set up with donor finance to buy carbon 
credits from farmers.  The trust fund is managed by representatives of farmer 
cooperatives, a local research institute and the Edinburgh Centre for Carbon 
Management  (foreign expertise).  A local company does much of the day to day 
administration and technical work.  Farmers produce their own plans for forestry and 
agroforestry, which are reviewed by the technical team, and sign a contract for the sale 
of the estimated carbon that is going to be sequestered. Most of the monitoring is done 
by the farmers themselves (reviewing farms in neighbouring villages), with only 
occasional and sample checking being necessary by the technical team (that is to say, 
the local company contracted for this).  Although this situation is rather different from 
measuring carbon savings in an existing forest, it does indicate that village people may 
be motivated by the financial rewards of selling carbon, and competent in making 
carbon measurements themselves, following a quite elaborate field manual of 
procedures.  
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6. Research on reducing carbon transaction costs of CBFM  
 
At this point the transaction costs for carbon in CBFM are not clear, and need to be 
investigated.   A research project working towards this end has recently been funded by 
the Directorate General for Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Netherlands, under its programme for capacity building for climate change.  The 
project is entitled “Kyoto: Think Global, Act Local – Action Research to Bring 
Community Based Forest Management Projects under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol”.  The lead institute is the Technology and Sustainable Development Section 
of the University of Twente (Enschede, the Netherlands), in partnership with ITC 
(International Institute for Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation, Enschede, 
Netherlands), ENDA Energy (Senegal), the Dept. of Geography, University of Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania (UDSM) and International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development (ICIMOD) in Nepal.   All of these institutes have been involved for years 
in research and training in community based forest management, and all recognize the 
opportunities that the international climate treaties potentially offer to this kind of 
approach.  They are also interested in new technological developments, which could 
facilitate participatory monitoring by local people of different aspects of forest 
sustainability, including carbon uptake. 
 
The aim of the research is to explore the potential for CBFM as an instrument both for 
carbon saving and to work towards justification of  CBFM as an allowable strategy 
under the climate agreements when these are revised in the next set of international 
negotiations (“Kyoto 2”, for the second commitment period).  This would also involve 
building capacity in the countries concerned to justify and present such projects under 
the treaties, and contributing to the scientific and technical debate as regards the rules 
and regulations as regards eligibility. 
 
6.1  Methodology 
Logic implies that if CBFM is to be included as a climate mechanism, a body of 
evidence needs to be built up to demonstrate its value and show that it can operate 
within the climate conventions.  In particular: 
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• First, it needs to be seen whether community based forest management does in 
fact result in higher levels of carbon held in the forest ecosystem in the form of 
above ground biomass, leaf litter and soil, and root stock compared to 
unmanaged forest, what quantities are sequestered per annum, and what aspects 
of management are most responsible for this 
• It needs to be shown under what circumstances this means of sequestering 
carbon is cheaper than other means or than the market price for carbon 
(otherwise CBFM will not be able to compete in the market for carbon) 
• It needs to be shown that the CBFM has considerable development benefits in 
addition to the carbon saved (ie meets criteria for sustainable development) 
• Reliable methods need to be developed to estimate and to verify such carbon 
savings and other benefits, and these methods should be as cheap as possible to 
use, otherwise the transaction costs may put CBFM carbon out of the market.  
• The relative cost of communities themselves gathering the valid and reliable 
data and preparing inputs to the project proposal, need to be assessed, compared 
with the same work being done by professionals.  These costs will vary 
depending on the ecological and physical conditions (variability of the forest, 
topography etc).  The costs of this kind of data collection represent part, but not  
the full transaction costs, which would also include a number of tasks which are 
unlikely to be carried out by the communities themselves, such as preparation 
and submission of proposal, verification etc. 
• The impact of carbon management on other aspects of forest management and 
the effects of this on the community, in other words the opportunity costs of the 
carbon management, needs to be monitored. 
• The institutional arrangements and implications as regards rights to carbon 
ownership need to be investigated. Under what conditions might communities 
themselves be the ‘owners’ of the carbon, with what implications; alternatively, 
communities might be seen as providers of an environmental service (saving 
carbon), and compensated financially for this, with the carbon rights remaining 
with other actors (private organizations or governments).  Questions also arise as 
to what kinds of intermediary organizations would be needed to set the project 
up, and to support the process technically (performing roles which the 
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community may not yet be in a state to do itself, such as preparation of baselines 
etc and to arrange for independent validation).  Questions also arise with regard 
to how to bundle independent, small scale CBFM projects together so as to 
achieve economies of scale in transaction costs, and the implications of this for 
autonomy, ownership, distribution of benefits, and overhead costs.  
 
The first conceptual step that the research has taken is to recognize that CBFM is not 
one activity but a combination of many and each may have a different effect (positive or 
negative) on the carbon balance.  Apart from different silvicultural operations, there are 
other activities which need to be examined.  For example, fencing to keep out cattle 
may protect saplings from trampling even though fodder is removed from the forest by 
hand.  Many CBFM programmes are accompanied by improved stove campaigns, 
which may also reduce forest offtake.  Efforts to introduce improved charcoaling 
technology, as in Senegal, may also have their carbon impacts.  Such activities have 
been grouped into three categories:  those that reduce the ongoing rate of degradation of 
forest and of deforestation itself (ie which slow or stop the loss of biomass); those that 
increase the stock of biomass (ie above its current level) and those that have the effect 
that sustainably produced woodfuel is used as a substitute for fossil fuels. 
 
The research is now testing whether community participation in data gathering, based 
on local knowledge and local perceptions of sustainability, standardized forest 
mensuration methods, and an electronic database which uses other sources eg basemaps 
and remote sensing data, would provide a cost effective and reliable data system.  
Earlier research in related fields has demonstrated that local communities are able to use 
hi-tech methods such as lap-top based GIS, sequential photo series (wide-angled, hand-
held), and a variety of electronic visualisation techniques to measure, record and display 
various environmental indicators (McCall, 2002).  There are both ideological (Thrupp, 
1989) and practical (Warren, 1991) reasons underlying the promotion of this kind of 
approach.  Use of such technology by local communities is developing rapidly and there 
are increasing numbers of examples of participatory applications using hand held 
computers in watershed management (Gonzales, 2000), land management (Foster 
Brown et al, 1995), customary land mapping (Sirait et al 1994), studies on trees outside 
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the forest (Rocheleau and Ross 1995) as well as in forest management (Jordan and 
Shrestra, 1998). 
 
On the basis of these kinds of findings,  the Kyoto, Think Global, Act Local project 
research team is working with hand-held computers, which operate by touch.  They are 
equipped with GIS and GPS facilities which are intended to enable mapping of the 
forest areas by people with no basic training in mapping or surveying.  The computer is 
also equipped with a tailor-made database programme for the input of data from forest 
sample plots.  This data concerns standard forestry measurements such as tree diameter 
at breast height, which can be used with allometric tables to derive the above ground 
biomass of the trees, and thus ultimately the carbon stock of the forest.  The database 
also allows inputs on weights of shrub and herb vegetation taken from sampling 
quadrats, which can also be translated into carbon values.  The results of field 
experiments in which local community members with 4 to 7 years of primary education 
use this system, are described in Box 1. 
 
The assumption behind the research is that much of the data gathering work can be 
carried out by the communities themselves, after brief training, although technical back-
up support will be necessary (e.g. programming the computers and inputting the base 
map,  possibly recharging the computer batteries, and certainly dealing with them when 
they fail for one reason or another) .  Other procedures that are beyond the scope of the 
community (e.g. preparation and submission of project proposal, validation and 
certification) would in any case require outside agents or brokers or independent bodies. 
Because of economies of  scale, such activities would require bundling of many 
community forest management areas into one umbrella project for carbon purposes.  
However, the monitoring of and reporting on carbon sequestered are tasks which, 
according to the results of field testing, could easily be carried out by the community 
themselves a much lower cost than if done ‘professionally’, since the carbon 
sequestered is a direct function of the increased biomass in the forest area.  Steps would 
have to be taken to show that this increase in biomass is the direct result of the 
management activities and not an independent on-going process (additionality), by use 
of a control area, but in all probability this could be done in one or two areas for the 
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verification of carbon gains of many community forest management areas under one 
umbrella project.   
   
 
6.2  Field results so far 
At the local level, research is taking place in communities which are already 
undertaking CBFM under a variety of schemes.  Two sites are included in Tanzania, 
one in Uganda, two in Nepal, two in Himalayan India, one in Senegal and two in Mali, 
with the possibility a further one in Burkina Faso.   
 
The aim has been to measure the sustainability of on-going CBFM projects (in 
ecological, economic and social terms), and to make an assessment of the carbon that is 
saved (sequestered) by these activities.  It is necessary not only to establish the carbon  
baseline but also the change in carbon level over time.   Working with the groups 
(usually NGOs) that are backstopping CBFM activity at the grassroots level,  the first 
step is to determine what indicators local people (or particular groups within the 
community) use in assessment of forest sustainability and health.  Studies carried out 
for example in the Usambaras of Tanzania (Mapande, 2003) indicate that such 
indicators do exist and can be formalized, even possibly quantified.  The main 
advantage of local indicators is that these often give very clear indications of differences 
of forest types/forest conditions within a given geographical area, and if such indicators 
can be shown to be consistent, this would very much simplify any forest sampling 
procedures.  Such classification can also be correlated with remote sensing and aerial 
data.   The idea is to combine such local knowledge with accepted forest science method 
when it comes to estimating the biomass stock.   
 
Once an overview of the different types of forest present has been established, the total 
area of forest and the sub areas within it are mapped by boundary walking using the 
GPS function on the hand held computer.  Despite some problems as regards getting 
GPS signals in heavy forest areas, this exercise generally creates no problems for local 
people.  The trajectory walked is immediately visible to the user on the computer 
screen, superimposed on any basemap or aerial photo which has been installed.  When 
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the circuit around a particular forest area is complete,  the computer is able to calculate 
the area immediately.  
 
Biomass stock assessment is done using standard forestry methods (dbh measurement 
and allometric tables).   Following IPCC Guidelines (IPCC 2003), based on earlier work 
by MacDicken (1997), a sampling framework involving a random start point for a 
systematic grid is being used to located permanent sample plots within the community 
forest areas, stratified where necessary.  The number of permanent plots required is 
calculated on the basis of the standard error of a limited number of pilot plots (which are 
also the plots used during the initial training session).  The locations of the permanent 
sample plots, are measured out by local people, using measuring tape.   The handheld 
computer, with its geo-referenced GIS data in combination with its GPS, enables careful 
plotting of the locations of the permanent plots and immediate entry of the data on tree 
parameters and other vegetation weights (see Box 1).  These tasks are not in principle 
difficult and do not require computer literacy (or even, necessarily, much conventional 
literacy).   
 
The cost of such an exercise depends on the sampling intensity in space and time (and 
thus also on the variability of forest conditions).  The reliability of the data produced 
(and the cost of the alternative) will be tested by independently contracting such work 
out to established professionals as a ‘control test’.  Assessment of the development 
impacts of the local forest management can likewise be made on the basis both of local 
(internal) indicators measured by local people and ‘scientific’ indicators measured by 
independent, outside researchers.   
 
In the first phase of the project, work with the villagers was done on an experimental 
basis, and the individuals involved were paid the going daily wage rate for participation 
in what was regarded as a research exercise.  However, in the next phase, participating 
villagers will be paid by the research project on the basis of the quantity of carbon 
actually saved, using project funds.  Under these circumstances there will naturally be a 
temptation to exaggerate gains, but the villagers will be aware that controls are in place, 
with professional teams doing unannounced spot checks from time to time.   
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4.1    Discussion 
4.2   Complications that need to be dealt with 
The question of reducing transaction costs is central: the hypothesis is that community 
data gathering will reduce transaction costs.  However, we have to face the possibility 
that this may not be so.  The forest inventories that are carried out by Forest 
Departments are largely the work of low-paid employees, although the work is 
supervised by more senior and well-paid officers or by international consultants.  It  
 
7. Discussion 
 
 
Box 1: Using hand-held computers for carbon assessment in  
the E. Usambaras, Tanzania 
 
 
A number of village forest reserves have recently be established in the area around the Amani 
Nature Reserve in the E. Usambara mountains of Tanzania.  In the Handei Village Forest 
Reserve, villagers, with technical help from forest officers, have drawn up management codes 
and practices to preserve these forest areas and have full rights over the products, which are 
now being harvested on a sustainable basis.  In fact, the primary motivation of villagers is the 
preservation of biodiversity because of the potential of earnings from eco-tourism in this area.  
Tourists wishing to walk in the forest are accompanied by local guides pay a fee, most of 
which goes into a community fund. 
 
Villagers fully appreciate the potential of marketing carbon as a by-product of their 
management activities.  A group of 6 members of the Village Forest Committee, none with 
more than standard 7 education, were involved in a participatory technology evaluation 
regarding the hand-held computer technology for carbon assessment.  First, standard forest 
inventory technique was explained, and an exercise carried out in which sampling plots of 
10m radius were established, and all trees greater than 5 cm dbh were measured, and 
recorded, with species name (local terms), in an exercise book.  Measurements of smaller 
trees were made on subplots and quadrats were used for undergrowth. 
 
Then, hand-held iPAQ computers (about 15cm by20cm) equipped with the GIS system 
ArcPad and with Navman GPS were used by the villagers after a very short training, to mark 
the boundaries of the forest area, on a O.S. base map which had earlier been scanned into the 
computer.  Boundary mapping requires simply walking around the margin of the forest and 
marking each turning point using a stylus on the touch screen.  No understanding of mapping 
principles or computers is necessary for this task.  Secondly, the villagers used the GPS 
function to navigate to the sample plots.  This enables monitoring to be done at intervals on 
the same site, without having to mark the site visibly on the ground.  The task involves simply  
lining up the ‘compass point’ on the screen with the direction arrow, while walking.   
 
Finally, data on individual trees in the sample plot (species, dbh, height, condition) was 
entered onto a pre-installed pull down form, using a touch keyboard on the screen.  Villagers 
had no difficulty entering this data using letters and numbers.   
 
The main difficulties encountered had to do with hardware problems – the GPS system did 
not function well in some cases – and with the fact that the computer screen carries a large 
number of functions unnecessary for the tasks required fo  th  exercise (th  machines are 
essentially Pentiums with all the functions of a normal office computer), which was 
unnecessarily confusing.  For example, the ‘zoom’ function, if hit by mistake, could make 
one’s posi ion on the screen disappear!  Clearly, technical backup is necessary to maintain 
these computers, and to install the necessary base maps etc.  Nevertheless, the exercise 
showed clearly that villagers without any prior understanding of computers were easily able 
to use them for a number of tasks associated with carbon monitoring.  Moreover, the potential  
of the device for other purposes – for example, in mapping village boundaries – was 
immediately perceived by themselves.  
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7.  Discussion 
 
The primary purpose of the field studies is to assess to what extent some of the 
transaction costs associated with CBFM as a CDM could be reduced if reliable data 
were to be gathered by local community people using high tech instruments, rather than 
by professionals.  The hypothesis is that considerable cost savings can be made without 
undue loss of reliability, and various aspects of this will be studied in the research sites 
over the next four years.   
 
There are however a number of other broader concerns that need to be taken up as spin-
offs from the research.   
 
(1) Carbon is only one of the many environmental services that local communities 
provide for the greater public in managing their forests.  Other services include 
biodiversity protection and watershed conservation, and like carbon up to now, the work 
that these services involve, and the opportunity costs of alternative, foregone activities, 
are not rewarded in financial terms.  There are no mechanisms available, no systematic 
funds, and no market for this.  The case for the valorization of carbon may be seen as a 
test for the later valorization of other forest services in the future.  The kinds of 
techniques used for the measurement of carbon could easily be adapted for data 
collection on other environmental indicators, and potentially make it possible for 
communities to take charge of the monitoring that would be required. 
(2) The case of carbon raises interesting questions regarding ownership and 
empowerment.  The forests concerned are in most cases considered property of the 
state, although in some cases the land has in fact been legally turned over to the local 
people.  If carbon becomes a profitable commodity, it is likely that there will be 
juridical questions regarding its ownership and control of this product.  There are two 
views on this: the one that predicts that control will be claimed and taken over by the 
state, and the one that predicts that it will be won by the local communities (the 
situation may vary from country to country).  Either way it is bound to bring to the fore 
a major debate on carbon entitlements.  This will inevitably bring with it a much needed 
debate also on the rights to and obligations as regards forests and their management in 
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the more general sense. Clarification of the rights of forest dependent people is long 
overdue, although bringing up this debate is not without its risks, and it is in no way a 
foregone conclusion that local peoples rights will be fortified everywhere.  
(3) The question of who gets what at the local level needs to be carefully monitored, 
especially as the stakes increase.  The market brings with it great power which may be 
used for preservation of forests, and for generation of income earning possibilities, but 
also the risk of increasing inequalities at the local level.  This needs to be carefully 
monitored, and ways and means of ameliorating the situation by building in 
conditionalities need to be considered.   
(4) At the same time the question of who gets what at different scales needs to be 
considered.  The purpose in reducing transaction costs is to ensure that a reasonable 
chunk of the profit remains with the carbon producers, that is, the local people who 
manage the forest, but inevitably they will receive only a part share as there are many 
other actors involved in the whole carbon marketing chain.  The bundling of different 
CBFM groups under umbrella organizations will be essential for economies of scale in 
this marketing but it will reduce the autonomy of the local group.  The success of this 
may depend on the transparency of the umbrella arrangement and the trust that develops 
between these levels, but also on the share that each level takes of the profit.  Then there 
are other levels to be considered: the national body that approves the project, the 
certification and verification service, the brokers cut, and the fees to the CDM 
Executive Board.  The profit levels at all points in the chain needs to be analyzed and 
understood if the long term chance of CBFM as a CDM option is to be properly 
assessed. 
(5)A further interesting aspect concerns whether the use of high tech means of gathering 
and transmitting data on carbon sequestered, increases its credibility.  Electronic storage 
of data undoubtedly reduces paperwork and the risk of transmission errors, and much 
speeds up the process.  In the past, rural communities have not been able to participate 
in international deals, not least because of the absence of any real line of 
communication; their knowledge and information have therefore been ignored. Will the 
use of electronic databases raise the status of the locally generated data such that it will 
be accepted as scientifically valid?  Could this usher in a new era in which marginalised 
rural people are able to enter the world conversation? Or will doubt about the capacity 
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of local people to perform essentially scientific measurements, and traditional 
information/power relationships prevail, despite the technological leapfrog? 
. 
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